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SOME COMMENTS ON OUR EXPERIENCE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY
Dale Harris*
I want to thank my good friend Judge Bennett for the oppor-
tunity to address this distinguished audience. His only instruction
was to be provocative. I hope I do not exceed his expectations.
Twenty years ago this autumn, I opened a small office on this
campus for the first Constitutional Revision Commission that had
been created by the 1969 Legislature. I can clearly remember walk-
ing into the office with one file folder labeled "constitutional revi-
sion." Three years later, at the conclusion of the election to adopt
the new constitution, the convention staff deposited over one hun-
dred boxes of files with the state archivist. Those three years docu-
ment three exciting years in Montana's history, in my life and in
the lives of hundreds and thousands of Montanans who partici-
pated in the remarkable process that gave Montana a new
constitution.
In the subsequent seventeen years, I have had the opportunity
to observe the impact of the 1972 Constitution from at least six
different perspectives. First, I directly worked with Governor
Judge's administration on general constitutional implementation
and then specifically with the implementation of the home rule
and local government reform provisions of the constitution. Sec-
ond, I served for two years on the staff of U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on intergovernmental relations as a consultant to other states
involved in similar reform efforts. Third, I spent four years with
Governor Schwinden's administration as the principal architect of
the development finance programs that now use coal tax trust
funds for loans and investments in basic sector Montana busi-
nesses. Under these programs, over 40 million dollars has been in-
vested in the Montana economy. Fourth, in 1985 I joined a small
entrepreneurial firm in Portland, Oregon and steered the firm
through the process of developing, patenting, and financing a
unique video technology. Fifth, I returned to Montana and was re-
tained by the Montana Ambassadors to develop their strategic
plan for economic development in Montana and to represent them
during the last legislature. Currently, I split my time between my
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business interests in Portland and the newly organized Montana
Tax Reform Coalition that has been organized to design and im-
plement a strategy that will result in the enactment of a compre-
hensive tax reform package.
Each of these experiences has broadened my perspective on
the 1972 Constitution and the 1972 Constitutional Convention.
Long ago I lost my fascination with the actual language of the con-
stitution and became more interested in its real, practical impact
on our society. The 1972 Constitution was a product of our society
and has a dramatic impact on shaping our society during the last
seventeen years. Hopefully my comments will illustrate this thesis.
To help you evaluate my specific comments, let me first advise
you that in 1990, I personally will vote to call the constitutional
convention, not because I feel the 1972 Constitution is deficient in
any fundamental sense, in fact I feel that it is one of the outstand-
ing political documents of the twentieth century. Rather, I will
vote for the convention as an act of political confidence in the indi-
vidual Montanans who would be elected to the convention and the
wisdom of Montanans who would ratify or defeat the proposals of
the convention.
I believe this generation of Montanans should be given the op-
portunity to shape and define both the governmental structure
under which they are governed and the rights they possess as citi-
zens. I believe that citizen respect and confidence in government
will be enhanced if citizens exercise their fundamental right to ap-
prove or reject the convention's proposals and I am confident that
citizens will reject any revisions that reduce or constrain the fun-
damental and innovative rights contained in the 1972 Constitution.
The 1972 Constitutional Convention not only renovated state
government institutions and expanded citizen rights, it recruited a
new generation of Montanans into the political process in the
1970s and transformed political behavior in the state. I believe that
a new convention would again attract fresh participants to the po-
litical scene and again invigorate the political process in Montana.
While I will vote for a convention, I am not seeking your vote for
calling the convention nor forecasting how the public should or will
vote. I am simply sharing my personal decision with you.
Second, I must advise you that I am not an attorney and I am
offering a political, not a legal, analysis of our constitutional expe-
rience. I will leave the legal analysis to my legal friends. During
this conference you will be exposed to many different perspectives:
legal, political, economic, journalistic, partisan, historic, environ-
mental, urban, rural, legislative, administrative, judicial and hope-
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fully that of common citizens. I am sure that you will be given
many standards for evaluating our or any constitution. I will only
suggest one simple criteria: Please remember that a constitution is
a document for allocating and controlling political power within a
society.
Such a constitution is a political document, not simply a legal
document. As you listen to presentations, ask yourself, what are
the political power issues being discussed? How is political power
being allocated and controlled? What are the sources of the consti-
tutional principles that are being advocated? Are they classical po-
litical issues dealing with the allocation and controlling of political
power or are they attempts to resolve short-term substantive issues
at the constitutional rather than statutory level?
Constitutional revision, like all human experience, has its own
"Murphy's Laws." I call these rules unconventional wisdom to dis-
tinguish them from the excellent conventional wisdom demon-
strated by all delegates and staff of the 1972 Constitutional Con-
vention. To illustrate these rules, I would like to draw your
attention to five examples of our society's experience with the 1972
Constitution. In each instance, the 1972 Constitution contains the
classical good government or good constitutional style provisions
advocated by political theorists, academics and legal scholars.
However, I would suggest that the practical results have been less
than admirable. Each example demonstrates that good constitu-
tional draftsmanship is no guarantee of good government. Collec-
tively, these five issues demonstrate that the goals of constitutional
reformers are frequently not achieved. In my opinion, each exam-
ple also suggests that we as a society may have a fundamental
problem with the legislature's ability to deal with difficult issues.
The 1972 Constitution gave the legislature almost total discre-
tion over public finance (more discretion than almost any of the
other 49 state legislatures). Since 1972 the legislature has used or
not used this discretion to create a public finance system that has
been rated fourth from the bottom among the fifty states by the
most objective non-partisan organization that systematically evalu-
ates such issues: the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations (ACIR). In case you suspect a conservative bias
to the ACIR, you will be surprised to learn that the Corporation
for Enterprise Development, funded by the AFL-CIO also gives
Montana an "F" for "Tax and Fiscal Environment." Somehow the
constitutional discretion granted the legislature to shape public fi-
nance has not been translated into meaningful results.
Perhaps we need to look to the bicameral structure of the leg-
1990]
3
Harris: Some Comments on Our Experience as a Constitutional Society
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
islature itself and question whether it is really appropriate for a
state with a history of strong partisan competitiveness that regu-
larly results in partisan splits in majority control of the two houses.
Legislative stalemate and deadlock on fiscal policy appears to be
the natural result of our bicameral system, no matter how much
discretion the constitution gives the legislature to deal with public
finance or other critical issues. Our state and local revenue system
created by the legislature is not only structurally deficient, it no
longer produces sufficient revenue to fund essential public services.
Annual state expenditures have exceeded annual revenues since
the early 1980s. The Legislative Fiscal Analyst Office has estimated
the revenue short fall for the next biennium will be at least 120
million dollars. Is a constitutional amendment that prohibits the
state from receiving more than thirty percent of its general reve-
nue from a single tax source an appropriate device to force legisla-
tive reform of our tax system?
When the 1972 Convention shifted responsibility for assess-
ment of property from counties to the state, the primary objective
was to equalize appraisal levels between counties in order to elimi-
nate the inequities between appraisal practices in different coun-
ties. The most recent ACIR study indicates this objective has not
been achieved in spite of two major reprisals cycles. In fact, legisla-
tive implementation of the reprisal process has resulted in situa-
tions where Montana now has the highest mill levies in the nation
and the lowest proportion of the market value of property classi-
fied as taxable value. This is just the opposite of a rational system
where the taxable value should be as close to market value as
possible.
A second serious consequence of legislative implementation of
reprisal has been the escalation since 1979 of the taxes on business
machinery and equipment to a level where they are three to four
times higher than any other state. This high rate of taxation is a
very serious obstacle to attracting business investment to Montana
and has driven at least 310 million dollars in taxable value from
this state. This is the largest loss of taxable value since 1931-1936.
Is a constitutional amendment prohibiting classification of prop-
erty for taxation an appropriate solution for forcing legislative ac-
tion to rectify this serious problem?
In another financial matter, the 1972 Constitution eliminated
a provision from the 1889 Constitution that the courts had inter-
preted as a prohibition on state aid to local government. In 1972,
Montana was one of three states without a significant program for
sharing state revenue with municipal and county governments. In
278 [Vol. 51
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/6
BACKGROUND
1989, there is still no significant state program for sharing state
revenue with local governments in spite of the passage by the vot-
ers of 1-105 which called for the legislature to provide local govern-
ments an alternative source of revenue. (Some claim that gambling
revenue will grow into a significant state revenue source.) Again,
constitutional discretion has not generated legislative action, in
spite of a citizen initiative. Is a constitutional mandate requiring a
certain level of state aid to local governments now an appropriate
constitutional option?
During the 1980s, thirty-six of fifty-six Montana counties have
lost population. Therefore, in most Montana counties, fewer and
fewer people are supporting the superstructure of fifty-six county
governments and over 500 school districts. There is no reason to
believe that the depopulation of large areas of Montana will not
continue into the next decade. The 1972 Constitution gave local
voters significant discretion to reform and reorganize county and
municipal governments. While a significant number of municipali-
ties have adopted the manager form of government and self-gov-
ernment power, with two significant exceptions in Butte-Silver
Bow and Anaconda-Deer Lodge, local voters have not used this
discretion to reorganize county governments. There may be simply
too many vested local interests in maintaining current county gov-
ernment structures to permit local reforms that require local voter
approval. Has the time come for Montanans to consider seriously
mandatory reorganization of outmoded and expensive local govern-
ment structures? The constitutional question becomes: Is the dis-
cretion of the 1972 Constitution sufficient or is mandating reform
now appropriate and perhaps economically and fiscally necessary?
Montana has faced a serious economic crisis during the 1980s.
When adjusted for inflation, we have lost at least one-fourth of our
industrial base when measured by gross receipts and even though
unemployment levels have now returned to 1979 levels, we are op-
erating on a basic sector economy that is approximately one-fourth
the size it was in 1979. As a result, at least 30,000 Montanans have
left the state. Why is our economic condition a constitutional is-
sue? Perhaps it's not. However, the response of the executive and
legislative branches to this crisis is an interesting example of the
capabilities of these two branches of government.
In my opinion, when compared to other states and provinces
in North America, a serious, competitive economic development
strategy has not emerged from either the executive or legislative
branches during the 1980s. Within the executive branch, the devel-
opment of a meaningful strategy has been seriously inhibited by
1990] 279
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the fragmentation of financial, business and security regulatory,
technical assistance and research functions between the constitu-
tional and therefore proprietary auditor's office, the constitutional
and therefore proprietary secretary of state's office, the constitu-
tional Department of Labor and Industry and the statutory De-
partment of Commerce. Perhaps the constitutional status for
traditional elected officials such as the auditor or secretary of state
are not innocent political tradition. Perhaps we should question
whether their constitutional status has a real impact on the state's
ability to deal with its serious problems. No one even noticed the
elimination of the elected treasurer's office, once it was done by the
1972 Constitution. No one will notice the elimination of the elected
secretary of state or auditor once it is done. Getting it done is an
entirely different matter. It will be extremely difficult because of
partisan considerations.
My final example of the inherent irony in constitutional provi-
sions is the constitutional coal tax trust that was added as an
amendment to the 1972 Constitution. The merit of constitutional
protection for a financial trust is obvious when the current integ-
rity of the constitutional coal tax trust is compared with the fate of
the statutory educational trust that was created at the same time.
When the hard times came, the statutory educational trust was ap-
propriated by the legislature and no longer exists.
However, there are two interesting aspects of the constitu-
tional coal tax trust. First, another constitutional provision pre-
vents its investment in common stocks even though the constitu-
tion permits retirement funds to be invested in common stock. The
board of investment's return on common stock over the past dec-
ade has averaged 18.3 percent while its return on bonds has aver-
aged twelve percent. Therefore, the state has foregone a significant
amount of revenue (and general taxation has been therefore
higher) because the constitutional provisions regulating investment
of the coal tax trust fund are more restrictive than the provisions
regulating investment of public pensions funds. This distinction is
difficult to justify economically, but Montana voters have refused
to amend the provision as recently as 1988.
Second, there is no doubt that, within the constitutional provi-
sions, the coal tax trust fund has been invested responsibly by the
Board of Investment created under the constitutional provision
mandating a "unified investment program." However, at least two
serious government reports have questioned the loss of purchasing
power of the trust because of inflation and have questioned
whether the trust is being actively managed on behalf of its benefi-
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ciaries-future generations. The reports question whether the con-
stitutional emphasis on a "unified government" program has em-
phasized the investment function and obscured the potential active
management of the trust to benefit future generations. Such active
management can be achieved without "busting" the trust. Perhaps
following Texas' example, the allocation of a portion of the trust to
the University System for its active management and investment
in research and development might result in significant long-term
benefit to the state's economy. Perhaps the emphasis of a "unified
investment program" specified in the 1972 Constitution has ob-
scured and blocked consideration of creative and responsible alter-
natives for managing the trust.
In 1969, when I first started interviewing state officials about
the impact of various provisions in the constitution, I found to ev-
eryone's surprise that legislators and money managers in state gov-
ernment were either ignorant of these constitutional provisions of,
if they were aware of them, they chose to ignore them because they
were considered fiscally irresponsible.
I learned at least five lessons from those interviews and my
years of observing our constitutional society. They are my rules for
unconventional wisdom. I think these lessons can be generally ap-
plied to most constitutional issues:
1. Constitutional provisions are not self enforcing, they have
only the prestige and authority given them by the government offi-
cials that operate under them and that, without judicial enforce-
ment, any, I repeat any, constitutional provision can be ignored
and typically is ignored. And judicial enforcement can be very ex-
pensive (ask the plaintiffs in the school equalization case).
2. Convincing the voters of the merits of technical amend-
ments to the constitution is extremely difficult.
3. Constitutional status for a function or activity often
preempts or at least frustrates creative and contemporary manage-
ment of a function or activity.
4. Be cautious. One generation's constitutional reform is often
the next generation's constitutional problem.
5. And my final comment: Good constitutional draftsmanship
is no guarantee of good government.
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